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Hemispheric Trade Agreements by Marian Goslinga

M
Free Trade and Immigration
by Saskia Sassen

At

tion's insistence, the
issue of immigration is
excluded from US-Mexican negotiations for a
the Bush administrafree-trade agreement.
The administration claims, however, that such an agreement will
stem illegal immigration from Mexico. This claim raises several questions: Does international evidence
support this stance? More generally, is it viable to deregulate investment and trade flows while
keeping tight restrictions on labor
flows? And under what conditions
would a free-trade agreement retain potential emigrants in Mexico
and prevent job losses and wage
cuts in the US?

Crossing Borders
North America is already a de facto
trade bloc, and Mexico's Border Industrialization Program has established a quasi free-investment zone
in that country's northern region.
In light of not only North American and European but now also
Japanese evidence, we cannot discount the possibility that a freetrade and investment bloc could
evolve into a regional free-labor
market.
To begin with, the considerable
growth of export-assembly industry
in northern Mexico over the last
two decades has not deterred the
migration of Mexicans to the US.

Saskia Sassen is professor of urban
planningat Columbia University and
a member of Hemisphere's editorial
advisory board. Her most recent book is
The Global City: New York London
Tokyo (PrincetonUniversity Press,
1991).
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Instead, the rapid expansion of the
maquilaprogram has encouraged
new migrations from the interior
of the country to its northern border zone, which in turn serves as a
platform for crossing into the US.
On a broader scale, the maquila
program has consolidated a transnational border economy, within
which trade, investment, and people move rather freely.
The same pattern characterizes
other countries with strong migration ties to the US. For example,
the enactment in 1965 of a new US
immigration law-aimed primarily
at the reunion of European families-initiated the renewal of mass
immigration to the US after several
decades' absence. The law's enactment took place in the context of
expanded US economic and military activities in South and Southeast Asia and the Caribbean Basin,
where the US was the dominant
First World presence. Simultaneously the US government passed
legislation aimed at opening its
own economy and those of other
countries to the flow of capital,
goods, services, and information.
So, who were most of the new immigrants? Not Europeans but
rather people from South and
Southeast Asia and the Caribbean
Basin, who crossed the newly built
economic and military bridges into
the US.
Still another case involves Japan,
which has never been an immigration country. Reflecting its quest
to preserve racial homogeneity,
Japan's law on the entry and exit
of aliens does not even include the
concept of immigration. Strikingly,
then, Japan is now receiving a growing influx of illegal immigrants.
These immigrants are overwhelmingly from leading Asian sites of

Japanese foreign investment,
trade, and aid: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines,
and South Korea. Could it be that
Japan has unwittingly created channels for the flow of not only goods
and capital but also people?
These cases suggest that, when it
involves countries of unequal development and unequal job opportunities, the forging of strong
economic and geopolitical relations promotes labor migration
from poorer to wealthier countries.
In the US case we have usually attributed the renewal of large-scale
migrations to the immigration law
of 1965. The Japanese case, however, indicates that the establishment of intense trade, investment,
and aid ties between unequal
partners fosters migration to the
wealthier country--even if the
latter's laws are unfavorable to immigration. The reasons are twofold. First, such ties serve as
channels for the international
movement of people. And second,
they enable potential emigrants to
familiarize themselves with the
country of destination.
How might this scenario unfold in the event of a US-Mexican
free-trade agreement? Such an
agreement could substantially
strengthen existing economic linkages and create new ones, from
cross-border personnel transfers to
the packaging and trucking of
goods made in Mexico (by either
US or Mexican firms) for the US
market. Such linkages would engender new patterns of communication, work, and travel between the
two countries, strengthening the
many bridges between them. They
would also further integrate Mexican workers into the US economy,
through employment in Mexico in

both US and Mexican firms geared
to the US market. Such patterns
could be expected to broaden and
intensify Mexican contact with US
popular and work cultures. Together, these conditions could
spawn a generalized notion that
people are entitled to free movement between the two countries.
We can therefore anticipate that a
free-trade pact would not diminish
the flow of Mexican workers to the
US. On the contrary, a free-trade
pact would probably further integrate Mexican workers-including
undocumented workers-into the
US economy.
This picture returns us to the
question of whether the deregulation of trade and investment but
not labor is a viable policy. The US
government has passed several laws
meant to regulate the number and
identity of immigrants. The results,
however, have been dubious. Thus,
the 1965 law, intended to attract
mainly Europeans, instead facilitated large-scale migrations from
Asia and the Caribbean Basin. And
the 1986 law, meant to stop illegal
immigration, has had the opposite effect as illegal entries have
reached unprecedented levels. Arguably, the limited success of these
and related laws stems from an incorrect assumption of US policymakers: that immigration flows are
unrelated to other international
flows, such as those of trade, investment, and aid.
As long as Mexico lags far
behind the US in economic development and employment opportunities, a free-trade accord is likely
not to reduce but to increase Mexican migration to the US. Rather
than be taken by surprise, policymakers should prepare for this
distinct possibility.

Uniform Standards
US and Mexican officials should
consider not only the benefits but
also the costs of a free-trade agreement. For instance, considerable
evidence suggests that, by taking advantage of Mexico's cheap labor
and weak environmental regulations, US firms not only would
cause job losses for US workers.
They would also create added pressures on many firms in the US to

lower wages, sidestep regulations
on work-place standards, and hire
undocumented immigrants. Further, the relocation of US firms
under these conditions would not
promote economic development in
Mexico: by neither upgrading jobs
nor increasing wages, it would fail
to raise the consumption capacity
of Mexican households and firms,
and thus would fail to generate
local economic linkages.

What policies could moderate these costs? A key approach
would be to implement uniform
work-place standards-from minimum wages to toxic emission
levels.
Not only would major firms operating in Mexico retain their competitive advantage of substantially
lower overall production costs. In
addition, improved employment
conditions and minimum wages
would lead more Mexican workers
to remain in Mexico instead of migrating to the US. What is more,
the consequent boost to economic
demand within Mexico would foster expanded consumption by the
country's households and businesses, thereby increasing the salesbased profits of foreign firms in the
Mexican market. Finally, a greater
effort at enforcement of uniform
standards in the US would reduce
the competitive advantage of Mexican illegal immigrants-i.e., their
willingness to work at below minimum wages and standards. This
result would protect jobs for US
workers, whether US born or not,
while further dissuading illegal
migration.
By raising the prospect of a
free-trade pact, US and Mexican
policymakers are breaking sharply
with tradition. In so doing they are
creating a platform for an even
more profound break with tradition: the reorientation of US-Mexican relations towards reasonable
wages and decent employment conditions. Aiming at authentic, sustainable development in Mexico,
rather than super profits through
cheap labor and environmental
degradation, should be an overarching goal of US as well as Mexican negotiators of a free-trade
agreement. .
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Commentary

An Informal Path to Development?
by Alejandro Portes

The OtherPath (1987), PeruHernando
economist
vian
n a much
celebrated
book,de
Soto argues that the informal,
or legally unregulated, economy offers a magical solution
to Latin America's deeply rooted
problem of underdevelopment.
According to De Soto, the entrepreneurial energies of Latin America's common people are constantly
blocked by an overgrown and inefficient state-the heritage of the
Spanish mercantilist traditionwhich sucks vast resources from the
economy and contributes little in
return. Popular enterprise drowns
in a mass of red tape, as arcane
regulations and greedy government officials make it too difficult
for people to try to implement innovative ideas.

crisis, but celebrated as a symptom
of the final breakdown of the mercantilist state. De Soto claims that
removing the bureaucratic handcuffs from common people will unleash their energies and ingenuity,
thereby giving a powerful impulse
to economic development. What
could be easier?

Again, The OtherPath does little but

De Soto's Path
In De Soto's opinion, informal enterprise is not simply a means of
popular survival; it is also the vehicle through which market forces
reassert themselves despite the distortions created by government
over-regulation. Following this
logic, the growth of the informal
economy throughout Latin America during the 1980s must not be
deplored as a sign of deepening

AlejandroPortes is professor of sociology
and internationalrelations at theJohns
Hopkins University, and Patriciaand
PhilipFrost VisitingProfessoratFlorida InternationalUniversity. He is a
member of Hemisphere 's editorial
advisory board. Portes is co-author
(with Ruben Rumbaut) of Immigrant
America: A Portrait (University of
CaliforniaPress, 1990).
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merely appropriates common
knowledge, long established and
accepted by students of poverty in
the region. Nor is there much new
in the indictment of red tape and
state inefficiency. That government agencies and officials in
Latin America have often acted as
predators rather than protectors of
civil society is a well-known fact established by historical and sociological studies of the region and
consecrated in a prominent novelistic tradition. Studies of urban informal enterprises during the 1960s
and '70s also show that among the
obstacles to their success was the
greed of petty officials, the impunity with which they preyed on humble vendors and producers, and
the periodic raids ordered by
higher-ups in the name of reestablishing "order" in public spaces.

Like all simple recipes to resolve
the woes of poor nations, this formula has elements of truth. Research among Latin America's
peasantry and urban "marginal"
population has consistently documented the entrepreneurial abilities of these groups and their
remarkable capacity to survive
under difficult economic conditions. In so portraying these segments of the population, De Soto

appropriate and reassert what was
already well-known.
De Soto uses these elements of
truth, however, to make plausible a
remarkable conclusion: that the
so far repressed entrepreneurial
spirit of the poor is a key to Latin
America's future development.
Deprived of its novel neopopulist
garb, the message is little more
than the long familiar "magic-ofthe-marketplace" doctrine. Eliminate state interference, it is said,
and the "invisible hand" will take
care of generating productivity,
entrepreneurship, and economic
growth. This free-market argument
has been partially discredited by its
association with the interests of the
wealthy, but De Soto's celebration
of the grassroots entrepreneur
gives his message a far more appealing veneer. This political quality of
The OtherPath largely explains its

enthusiastic embrace by the IMF,

the World Bank, and USAID officials, who had previously confronted enormous difficulties in
selling laissez-faire policies to Latin
American and other Third World
governments. Thanks to the support of these agencies, De Soto was
catapulted into international prominence as an articulate defender of
the market in the name of the
poor.

The economic potential of the
informal economy is not limited to
its role as a means of subsistence
for the poor. Nevertheless, in every
case where informal enterprises
have succeeded in transcending
that level, the achievement was
preceded by events that limited

Obstacles inthe Path
Unfortunately the model does not
work. The difficulties are obvious
upon realizing that De Soto's proposal is simply to let popular economic initiatives-often created as
an alternative to destitution-compete in an open and "level" market
field. Devoid of external support,
most micro-entrepreneurs lack the
capital, the technological knowhow, and the market information
to do so successfully. Many of these
popular enterprises have managed
to survive by taking advantage of
state regulation of large formal
firms. By avoiding the inflexibility
and cost associated with such regulation, the smaller entrepreneurs
partially compensate for their disadvantages in capitalization and
technology. By removing state
protection of formal workers and
other current regulations, De
Soto's program would certainly
make large corporations more
agile and competitive. Ironically,
though, such action would do little
for, or even reduce the competitiveness of, the informal entrepreneurs in whose name the program
is being implemented. Herein lies
the appeal of The OtherPath. The
program would consolidate the
hegemony of large firms by eliminating costs incurred for the protection of workers; that is, the
capitalist firms would gain at the
expense of the workers and small
enterprises on whose behalf the
program is advocated. In the absence of the marginal advantage
created by the legal protection of
workers, small enterprises would
lose their competitive terrain.

rather than "freed" the play of market forces. For example, the much
celebrated experience of central
Italy, where small industrial enterprises have achieved striking prosperity, is cemented on the basis of
class solidarity among independent
artisans, which constrains their internal competition, and on active
support and assistance by the regional government.

The same elements are found
in those instances documented by
empirical research where small artisans and vendors have coalesced
into an "informal economy of
growth." The first of these is extraeconomic solidarity among the
firms based on a common ethnicity
or history, which encourages cooperative links instead of market competition among the firms. The
second is the provision of subsidized credit, training, and marketing assistance to the fledgling firms
by local government authorities.
The transformation of grassroots
enterprises from means of survival
to vehicles of self-sustained growth
has hitherto depended not on removing the state from the market.
Instead it has depended on controlling the market's atomizing
effects among small producers,
including the encouragement of
state involvement in focused and efficient ways.
The experiences of central Italy,
Hong Kong, and several ethnic enclaves in US and Latin American
cities indicate that there is indeed
"another path" for economic
growth rooted in popular entrepreneurship. Yet each such experience
negates De Soto's model because
the underlying social processes are
exactly the opposite of those advocated by free-market ideology and
the international agencies under
its spell. Laissez-faire policies may
well stimulate large-scale capital
investments and the expansion of
multinational corporations, but to
build a "leg" for economic development based on the entrepreneurial
initiatives of common people calls
for a very different set of policies. .
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Abortion Politics in Nicaragua
by Martha L Morgan

abortion may be the galvanizing force of Latin
American feminism in
the decade ahead. Proposals in 1990 to liberalize
criminal restrictions on abortion
sparked heated debate in Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. Meanwhile the legislature of the
Mexican state of Chiapas modified its criminal code to broaden
the availability of legal abortions,
a measure that generated so much
controversy that it was suspended
pending an opinion from the Comisi6n Nacional deDerechos Humanos.
Latin America is certainly ripe
for abortion law reform. Mexican
psychotherapist Sylvia Marcos estimates that--driven by poverty and
desperation-Latin American
women undergo some 12 million
abortions each year. Indeed, the
health complications of illegal abortions are thought to be the leading
cause of death among Latin American women between the ages of 15
and 39. Estimates of the mid-1980s
share of maternal deaths due to
illegal or clandestine abortions for
selected countries are revealing: Argentina, 35%; Chile, 36%; Colombia, 29%; and Costa Rica, 30%.
In Nicaragua the debate over
the decriminalization of abortion
first erupted during the mid-1980s
under the Sandinistas. Yet, even
though its current president, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, is Latin

MarthaI. Morgan is professorof constitutional law at the University ofAlabama. She is the author of "Founding
Mothers: Women's Voices and Stories in
the 1987 NicaraguanConstitution,"
Boston University Law Review
(1990).
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America's only female head of
state, Nicaragua now seems to rank
among the least likely of Latin
American countries to tackle the
matter of abortion law reform.

Sandinista Policy
In 1985 a report in the Sandinista
newspaper Barricadaon a study by
doctors at Managua's Bertha Calder6n Hospital-the only hospital in
Nicaragua that serves exclusively
women-drew public attention to
the gravity of the country's problems with illegal abortions. The twoyear study focused on the plight of
the vast majority of women who, unlike the privileged minority, do not
have access to safe, if illegal, abortions. It reported that 45% of the
hospital's admissions consisted of
women suffering from the effects
of illegal abortions. A later study

showed that complications from
illegal abortions were Nicaragua's
leading cause of maternal deaths,
rising from 33% in 1980 to 53% in
1985.
Not until 1989, however, did the
Ministeriode Salud officially recognize illegal abortions as the principal cause of maternal deaths. In
the meantime, demands for the
decriminalization of abortion surfaced both during and after the
adoption of the 1987 constitution.
Yet the Sandinista government continually side-stepped the abortion
issue, thus avoiding confrontation
with the leadership of Nicaragua's
Catholic Church. Sex education
and access to contraceptives-two
other components of the assertion
of women's "right to motherhood
freely chosen"'-found readier acceptance under the Sandinistas.
War and economic crisis, however,
limited the success of programs in
these spheres.
Given the unwillingness of the
Sandinistas to support the repeal
of the criminal code's prohibitions
on abortion, health-care professionals took initiative themselves to alleviate the law's harsh impact. At
Bertha Calder6n Hospital they
began to emphasize emergency
treatment for women with complications from illegal abortions,
thereby reducing the number of
deaths. A related effort focused on
the penal code's exceptions to
criminal liability for "therapeutic"
abortions (if approved by three hospital committee members and consented to by the woman's husband
or a parent). 'Therapeutic" is not
defined in the code, but it had
been traditionally interpreted in
the narrow sense as referring only
to abortions medically necessary
to save a woman's life.
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The committee in charge of approving requests for therapeutic
abortions at Bertha Calder6n Hospital was restructured during the
Sandinista years. This restructuring
began in 1986 in response to a case
in which the mother of a 14-yearold, mentally retarded paraplegic
victim of alleged incest requested
such an abortion for her daughter,
only to have the all-male committee meet five times without reaching a conclusion. Eventually the
committee acceded to the demands of the hospital's employees
that the abortion be authorized.
The committee, however, resigned,
and was replaced by a committee
of three women doctors. The new
committee and the Ministeriode
Salud broadened the interpretation
of "therapeutic" to include cases
such as incest and rape reported to
the police, as well as proven failure
of contraceptive method.
Under the revised interpretation, the approval rate for therapeutic abortions rose markedly.
Defending this approach, one
woman remarked: "An unwanted
pregnancy is a pathology, an illness. It's a risk to have an unwanted pregnancy, and we can
demonstrate that with the women
who've died or who've stuck metal
rods within themselves after having
passed before committees that told
them no."

Chamorro's Policy
Clearly, reform of the 1974 Nicaraguan Penal Code's criminalization
of all but therapeutic abortions
would have been uncertain even if
the Sandinistas had defeated Chamorro in the presidential election
of February 1990. The Chamorro
government, however, has been

openly allied with Nicaraguan cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo. Given
reports of its close ties with leading
charismatic Catholics as well, it is
no surprise the government has
been aligning its policy with mainstream Catholic teachings on contraceptives and abortion.

For instance, the Ministerio de
Educaci6n has reportedly banned
the explicit sex education materials
previously used in some schools.
Education minister Humberto Belli
argues that schools should reinforce "Christian values," including
the view that "sex is the door to procreation." Health minister Ernesto
Salmer6n has been somewhat
more flexible regarding sex education, allowing his ministry's involvement in family planning and AIDS
education. Yet Salmer6n's flexibil-

ity does not extend to abortion.
Measures implemented under his
administration at Bertha Calder6n
Hospital have blocked access to
what had become a source of safe
and legal abortions for a growing
number of women. These measures include revised guidelines on
therapeutic abortions as well as
another round of changes in the
membership of the committee that
rules on such abortions. The new
committee, which consists of one
female and two male doctors, is adhering to an extremely narrow definition of "therapeutic."
Struggling to stabilize the impoverished and strife-ridden country,
President Chamorro herself has
reportedly had little direct involvement in the abortion controversy.
Still, in a 1987 interview presented
in Denis Lynn Daly Heyck's Life
Stories of the NicaraguanRevolution
(1990), Chamorro revealed that
doctors once advised her against
continuing a pregnancy because of
a negative RH factor. "But since
Pedro [Chamorro] and his family
were so Catholic," she recounted,
"an abortion was out of the question. We went to talk with representatives of the Church, to priests
and so forth, but the outcome was
that the child would be born come
what may. ... That's life; one has
to have faith in God, that's the only
way." The child, whom Chamorro
referred to as her "little angel,"
died a few hours after birth.
Apart from Chamorro's personal views about abortion, her
government's close alignment with
Cardinal Obando y Bravo, and
Nicaragua's continuing challenges
of economic underdevelopment
and political conflict, make highly
unlikely the liberalization of abortion laws during her presidency. *
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Reports: Politics of Birth

Birth-Control Politics in Peru
by Sam Dillon

when thousands of peasants fleeing
the highlands surrounded Limna
with shantytowns. But General
Juan Velasco, then Peru's military
leader, believed birth control to be
an imperialist plot to suppress the
Third World. He jailed Ramos for a
week in 1974 and confiscated his
private birth-control counseling
clinic.

President

has committed Peru to
one of Latin America's
most ambitious familyplanning programs, built
Alberto Fujimori
around free distribution
of contraceptives in thousands of
government health facilities-all in
aggressive defiance of the country's
Roman Catholic bishops. The action amounts to the most dramatic
reversal of any Latin American
country's population policy since
Mexican president Luis Echeverria
launched a sweeping national
family-planning program in 1972.
Fujimori's actions have proved popular, leaving the bishops more isolated in their views than at any
point in recent memory. "We're beginning a new era," said Dr. Miguel
Ramos, 69, the gynecologist who
pioneered family planning in Peru
and today heads the Institute for
Responsible Parenthood.
For decades, birth control had
been a bad word in Peru, a suspicious activity forced virtually underground by hostile governments
acting in deference to Catholic
authorities. In 1974 police seized
Peru's only family-planning clinic
and jailed its director on morals
charges. As a result, demographers
have considered the country's population policies to be among the
hemisphere's most backward, with
hundreds of thousands of women
bearing children they don't want
and are too poor to feed. '

Shantytowns Grow
Peru's developing population crisis
was already evident in the 1960s,

Sam Dillon is a Latin America correspondentfor the Miami Herald.

8

Hemisphere. Winter/Spring 1991

Fewer women use contraceptives
in Peru than in almost any other
Latin American country, just 23%,
according to the Ministerio de Salud.
Thlat has meant that although opinion polls show that the average
Peruvian woman wants just 2.7 children, she bears 3.7. In the Andes
Mountains, the average peasant
woman bears 6.3 children.

150,000 Abortions

In the years since, the principal
opposition to family planning
shifted to the bishops, Ramos said.
Fujimori's two immediate predecessors, Fernando Belainde and Aln
Garcia, both initiated timid familyplanning programs, only to withdraw support in the face of outcries
from the bishops.
Fujimori's support for population control seems to have developed from his awareness-as the
rector of the UniversidadAgrariadel
Pern---of the problems stemming
from Peru's limited arable land. At
just one-third of an acre per person, it is the lowest of any Latin
American nation. In 1988 Fujimori
hosted a televised debate on population issues that increased his familiarity with the statistics of Peru's
crisis.

As a consequence, nearly one in
every five pregnancies ends in illegal abortion--150,000 per year.
Every 43 hours, a woman bleeds to
death from abortion complications. The Ministerio de Salud
spends more money on blood
and surgery to repair the damage
from botched abortions than for
healthy childbirth.
Fujimori did not mention his
strong views on these topics as a
presidential candidate. But Carlos
Aramburu, the president of Fujimori's Consejo Nacionalde Poblacidn,
recalled in an interview that days
after Fujimori'sJune 1990 election
he ordered advisers to develop a national program for "efficient family
planning."
Aramburu and others developed

the plan that in 1991 will triple the
number of condoms and intrauterine devices and quintuple the
birth-control pills distributed in
government health facilities. Expanding government services over
the next decade should bring contraceptives to about half of Peru's
women by the turn of the century,
said Dr. Jorge Parra, the health
ministry official administering the
program.
The plan is ambitious, but
even more striking were the forceful terms in which Fujimori an-

nounced it in a speech on October
23, 1990, and defended it against
Catholic attacks over the following
weeks, said David Tejada, Peru's
deputy health minister. "Because
of church opposition, the Peruvian
state has always been afraid to have
a clear population policy," Tejada
said. "But Fujimori made clear
from the beginning he had no fear
of the church."

Quiet Resentment
Fujimori, himself a Catholic, had
been nursing a quiet resentment
ever since an incident during the
presidential campaign: Lima's archbishop, Augusto Vargas Alzamora,
reacted to Fujimori's popularity
among Peru's evangelical Protestants by rescheduling a series of
outdoor religious processions from
October to May 1990 in a thinly disguised effort on behalf of Fujimori's opponent. Understanding
the widespread, quiet frustration
with the Church's opposition to

birth control in a nation that is
95% Catholic, Fujimori picked an
issue on which the bishops were
extremely vulnerable. And he appeared to relish his confrontation
with them when it came.
Three days after he announced
the program, the bishops' conference denounced Fujimori's
program, reiterating Church opposition to all birth control except abstinence and the rhythm method,
and insinuating that Fujimori had
buckled under to pressures for population control from the developed
world. Fujimori shot right back, accusing unnamed Catholics of "recalcitrant opposition" and "medieval
thinking" about birth control.
"There is nothing terrible about
not wanting children to eat garbage in the streets," Fujimori said.

Fujimori scoffed at the bishops' insistence on "natural" birth-control
methods as unrealistic. "Why act
with fear?" Fujimori said, smiling at
the cameras. Finally, the bishops appeared to throw in the towel when
Vargas Alzamora pleaded with reporters to stop airing the issue. "In
the end, the government will do
whatever it wants," he said.
A foreign priest who has worked
in Peru for more than 20 years said
the bishops, following the Vatican's
hard-line dictates on the issue, had
isolated themselves even from the
country's more than 3,200 priests
and nuns. 'The clergy is very uncomfortable with the bishops' recent statements," the priest said.
"People are saying, 'Monsignor
Alzamora, please shut your
mouth.'" a

Trading Barbs
The president and the clerics
traded hostilities for nearly three
weeks. In one television interview,

Editor'sNote: Adapted with permission
from an articlepublished in the Miami
Herald (December2, 1990).
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Reports: Politics of Birth

Debt Crisis, Birth Crisis
by Linda M. Whiteford

Sree

principle, a state-provided
to the
service
health
carecitizens
is, in of
the Dominican Republic.
During the 1960s and
1970s the government
made steady improvements in its
health care delivery system; between 1950 and 1970 the national
infant mortality rate dropped from
150 to 73 deaths per 1,000 live
births. The economic crisis of the
last decade, however, bankrupted
the public health system and reversed such progress.
Sugar exports, the traditional
mainstay of the Dominican economy, fell drastically when the US
slashed its sugar quota during the
mid-1980s by 33%. Combined with
the worldwide depression in sugar
prices, the reduction of US purchases cut the Dominican Republic's sugar-export earnings by
27%. The government spent 70%
of its shrinking export revenue on
a swelling foreign debt.
In the meantime real wages
plunged as prices for basic commodities rose and food subsidies
were removed. In 1988 Dominicans
rioted in response to the austerity
cuts demanded by international
agencies as part of a debt restructuring agreement. In particular,
workers in the transportation
unions struck to protest wage and
price controls, while physicians

Linda M. Whiteford is associateprofessor of anthropologyand directorof the
Medical Anthropology Programat the
University of South Florida.She is the
co-author (with Marilyn Poland)of
New Approaches to Human Reproduction: Social and Ethical Dimensions (Westview Press, 1989).

10

Hemisphere

Winter/Spring 1991

struck against their own low wages
and poor working conditions.
In this context the Dominican
state's capital expenditure on
health slumped to well below its
1970 level. Thus the public healthcare system was weakened by poorly maintained facilities, a lack of
equipment, and a shortage of medicines. Formally speaking, access to
health care remains free. Patients,

however, are required to provide
their own bed linens and medicines. Furthermore, women who
plan to deliver their babies at public hospitals are told to buy whatever supplies they need at the local
pharmacy and to bring those supplies to the hospital with them.
These include the xylocaine, pitocin, and sterile gloves commonly
used during labor and delivery.
Immediately after delivery, women
and their newborn infants are
wheeled into a recovery room and
placed in a bed where they remain
for the following 12 to 24 hours
until they are discharged. Often
they share the bed with another
woman and her infant. Frequently
neither woman can supply a sheet
or pillow, so they lie feet-to-head
on plastic mattresses. And more
often than not, there is no running

water with which to wash, forcing
women to spend their recovery
time lying in their own blood.
While labor and delivery are dangerous, inadequate and nonexistent postpartum care contribute to
rising mortality rates. For instance,
in the mid-1980s 50% of women
who gave birth in Dominican public health facilities had no prenatal
care. Of the remaining 50% twothirds of them had no prenatal
care until the second or third trimester of their pregnancies. Meanwhile, fewer than 3% of total births
receive any postpartum care. As a
consequence of poor nutrition,
large numbers of Dominican
women begin labor with moderate
or severe anemia, increasing the
likelihood of hemorrhage and infection. More than half of maternal
deaths are due to postpartum infections commonly associated with
Cesarean sections performed in unhygienic conditions.
Among newborns, almost onethird of deaths are due to causes
that could be prevented by adequate labor and postpartum care.
The most common cause of newborn death is "unclassified anoxic
infections," a result of poor medical care during labor, delivery, and
postpartum. Adequate care during
these high-risk periods would also
prevent infections of the fetus and
newborn, the second most frequent cause of perinatal mortality.
The economic crisis in the
Dominican Republic has turned
the country's public health system
into a mockery of its aims: the provision of free and adequate health
care. As a result, the population's
freedom from "fee-for-service" medical care has exacted the cruel cost
of suffering and death among infants and mothers. *

New from University Presses of Florida

a in the 1850s
ough the Lens of
arles DeForest Fredricks

U.S. Policy in Central America

)bert M. Levine

The Endless Debate

Previously unpublished, these
photographs document a
turning point in Cuban life,
as the island was on the
verge of social, economic,
and technological moder-

Dario Moreno

nity . ..This intriguing

little album will delight
both students of Latin
American history and phor t
troral
atJtxy
pv

ll.f
asnns
flfl".ullo.
-vv
#

University of South Florida Press

Cloth $22.95

Jamaican Sayings
With Notes on Folklore,
Aesthetics, & Social Control
G. Llewellyn Watson

"A rich and compelling collection that will make a significant contribution to the study of Jamaican/West Indian/
black folklore and culture."-Daryl Cumber Dance,
Virginia Commonwealth University
Florida A & M University Press
January 272 pp. 6 X 9 Cloth $29.95

"An excellent analysis of the evolution of U.S. Central
American policies under the Carter and Reagan administrations that exposes the roles played by competing
strategic visions and bureaucratic interest groups in shaping two of the most dramatic failures in recent U.S. foreign policy."-Andrew A. Reding, World Policy Institute
Florida International University Press
Cloth $26.95 Paper $14.95

Central America and the Middle East
The Internationalizationof the Crises

Edited by DamidnJ.Fernindez
'This valuable contribution addresses a neglected dimension of the current crisis and goes far to explain why
Central American conflict has been so hard to resolve."
-G. Pope Atkins, U.S. Naval Academy
Florida International University Press

Cloth $26.95 Paper $15.95

The Libro de las profecias

e

VA

of Christopher Columbus

Conchtown USA
Bahamian Fisherfolk in Riviera Beach, Florida
Photographs and Text by Charles C. Foster
Folk Songs and Tales collected by Veronica Huss
'The combination of folklore, oral history, and photographs makes this a work of interest to general readers and
scholars alike."-Stetson Kennedy
Florida Atlantic University Press
April 160 pp. 8 1/2 X 11 Paper $24.95

Amphibians and Reptiles
of the West Indies
Descriptions, Distributions, & Natural History

An en face editon
Translationand commentary by
Delno C West anl AlmAut Klminr

VAIDAS

4

OW

"Perhaps the most important
single volume on Columbus ever
published in English.... The
uthors' classification of Columbus's
ty as 'evangelical' will be controial, but is exactly right. He was as
aopolitan in his piety as in his
ography."-Leonard Sweet,
dent, Union Theological Seminary
University of Florida Press
May 288 pp. 8 1/2 x 11 Cloth $49.95

Albert Schwartz and Robert W. Henderson
"A definitive synopsis of West Indian herpetofauna. "
-George R. Zug, National Museum of Natural History,
Smithsonian Institution
University of Florida Press

May 740 pp. 7 X 10 Cloth $75.00

Through your local full-service bookseller, or direct from:
University Presses of Florida, 15 N.W. 15th St., Gainesville,
Florida 32611. 904-392-1351. Include $3.00 (UPS) or $2.00
(bookpost) shipping for the first book, $.50 for each additional
book. Florida residents add 6% sales tax to book price.

Hemisphere . Winter/Spring 1991

11

Reports: Caribbean Art

A Headless Culture?
by Michele Baj Strobel

rary artists in the
Antilles so
French
hy are contempolittle known compared to their colleagues elsewhere
in the Caribbean? There is a virtual
absence of an art market in Martinique and Guadeloupe. As overseas departments of France, the
two islands are marginalized by
their geographical distance from
the metropolis. At the same time,
their special relationship with
Europe has hampered integration
into the Caribbean and the creation of ties with regional neighbors.
In contrast to other Caribbean
societies, the French Antilles manifest a remarkable paucity of popular plastic art. The earliest attempts
at creolizing Antillean art that we
know of were based on mimicry of
European forms with local adaptations. After World War II, however,
various articles published in the
journal Tropiques, under the editorship of Aim C6saire, signaled the
beginnings of change. Questions
of identity began to emerge that
would mold the character of a
burgeoning creole creativity. The
Ecole des Arts Appliques was established in 1945; together with the
Atelier 45, which brought together a
group of Martiniquan painters, this
represented a first effort to stake
out the island's identity through
painting. Nevertheless, the great
majority of pieces were not fundamentally distinguishable from their
imported neoimpressionist or neofauvian predecessors. Despite a

Michile Baj Strobel is an art historian
and anthropologistat the Ecole
Rdgionale d'Artes Plastiquesde la
Martinique.
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veneer of "local color" dependent
on a folklorization of the paintings'
themes, there was little to distinguish them from any other tradition of regionalist painting.

Quest for Identity
Today's generation of active
Martiniquan painters has been
attempting to break the yoke of artistic imitation and borrowing, focusing instead on a transformation
of the artist's message and a redefinition and expansion of artistic
techniques. This generation has
been preoccupied with a search for
"roots," for which Cesaire in some
sense laid the foundations. This
quest for the source has been a primary concern for members of the
Negro-Caraibe movement, leading
some of them back to Africa itself.
These new thrusts were specifically designed to break away
from the European aesthetic presence, to sweep the decks clean
of a strongly imitative tradition.
Graphic artists who formed the

group Fromajeiin1984 wanted to
underscore the syncretic character
of Antillean identity: the African
and Amerindian heritages were
used to create the crucible of a new
artistic movement, a fabric woven
out of a heterogeneous assortment
of cultural threads.
In the meeting of these diverse
influences and mixings, which continues to characterize Martinique
in the 1990s, many different contributions come together. There is a
simultaneous tendency, however,
to envision them somewhat simplistically as either the products of a
single (mythologized) African reality or the direct outgrowth of Amerindian and Maroon influences.
The search for authenticity is thus
reduced to a gilded rescue mission-a kind of archeological nostalgia--designed to substitute for
the whole tradition of Western
painting. It is a strategy still firmly
based on an imitative process and
does little more than sidestep the
question of origins: Maroons or

Amerindians may become the preferred referent, but what is really
happening is the substitution of
one model for another.
Part of the problem is the failure to recognize that true authenticity is not preserved, but rather
produced. This inherent weakness
leads to a multitude of dilemmas.
What does the artist start with or
merge with, and to whom does he
pay allegiance? Should one begin
by staking out a territory, a kind of
ancestral land, from which one can
paint from the heart? And then polish up one's roots in order to allow
an artistic blossoming based on selfselected origins? Is not identity continually being reconstructed? What
society today can boast of a single
cultural origin?

From Martinique
In June 1989 Martiniquan painter
Ernest Breleur, a member of the
Negro-Caraibe movement, exhibited a series of 50 paintings in Fort
de France. This show was to mark
his break with Fromaj, which he
helped found immediately after
completing his studies in Paris.
He speaks of his involvement in
Fromajias a necessary step, but one
that eventually led to a dead end.
"I came to realize that I was using
forms that had already had another life, that I was simply inserting them into a new context, and
that I didn't need to draw on them
anymore. We took comfort in African and Arawak motifs and created
for them a kind of authenticity or
recognition value, as if the meaning would follow on its own."
His goal now, along with other
Caribbean artists he associates
with, is to explode this closed
world. He had an exhibition in
September 1990 in Caracas and is
now arranging one in France, since
it is clear that a French Antillean
artist's career now depends on Parisian galleries as surely as an Antillean writer's does on the literary
programs of French television.
Breleur stresses his wish to lay
bare his individuality in his current work; he is engaged in a selfconscious attempt to be part of a
current Western reality, which paradoxically has the effect of isolating
him within an Antillean context.
This personal choice, and his positive affirmation of solitude, constitute the motivating force behind
his creative work.
Over the past two years, Breleur
has thus liberated himself through
paintings of a fictional world that
relates more to myth than to daily
life. These untitled canvases catalogue the varieties of the drama of
existence. Headless women of voluminous proportions travel through
a nocturnal space dominated by
the moon. They try to fly, to touch
or to.capture the heavenly body,
sometimes close, sometimes distant, creating precarious scaffold-

(Paintingby Ernest Breleur;photographedby Rene Maran)

ing and subterfuges to reach it. In
some paintings, the obsessive presence of an eminently expressive
dog brings things down to earth.
Yet this framework serves to
open, up the world of the imagination./Search for the moon? For the
impossible? Initiation quest? In all
probability, it is a uniting of two
worlds. The portrayal of nocturnal
flight represents the precariousness of human activity: a shaky scaffolding poised somewhere between
the real and the imagined. Painting then becomes the transfiguration and transgression of desire
into reality, but it is the passage
itself that is open to view-with
humor and agitation. At times the
hybrid women, making their way to-

ward some kind of metamorphosis,
are clinging, and express a message
embedded in all mythology: the
struggle against mortality. In their
flight, they traverse the canvas
against the background of a flat
horizon, and explode in a shattering burst of sensual corporeality.
Beyond the initial imagery,
these paintings are also the traversing of a culture, of a style, since
such figures in flight and metamorphosis are a constant of creole oral
tradition. It speaks from within,
with oral motifs that rest on tales
told in the course of wakes in the
full moonlight, which, through agricultural cycles and religious rituals,
exerts a powerful influence on
French Antillean society. *

Hemisphere * Winter/Spring 1991

13

Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Does Anyone Remember?

Watch Out, No. 1

Wake Up-Before It's Too Late

President George Bush's longawaited trip to South America in
December 1990 was clearly upstaged by the looming war in the
Persian Gulf. As journalist Lawrence Weschler wrote: "Each morning ... newspaper readers could
open to a front page picture of
Bush pounding home some new
point about Saddam Hussein,
flanked by some new incidentallyidentified-if-only-in-passing (and
entirely interchangeable) Latin
American head of state. ... Collor
and Menem and Aylwin in turn
were allowed to stand in as substitutes for the role usually reserved
for this year's cerebral palsy poster
child at the latest Oval Office
photo-op" (ColumbiaJournalism
Review, January/February 1991,

Latin American and Caribbean
shrimp exporters may find the US
market closed as of May 1, 1991.
As a result of a bill passed by Senators Bennett Johnston and John
Breaux, both Democrats of Louisiana, federal guidelines have been
established for a three-year plan
to use turtle excluder devices in
shrimp nets. A country such as Mexico stands to lose nearly $310 million in sales and 8,000 jobs.

A telling communique was issued
by the Third Europe/Caribbean
Conference, held in Kingston,
Jamaica, November 29-30, 1990.
According to the statement, "the
region had not grasped that traditional links to metropolitan states
and certain commitment on aid,
based on East/West polarisation,
were coming to an end and that
models of development would
need to be changed." The key question? "How a single Caribbean market, involving all countries of the
region, will fit into the economic
environment of a world split into
major trading blocs." The gathering was sponsored by the West
India Committee of London.

p. 10.)

Right Place, Wrong Time
Senior US military advisers were
in the Panamanian police headquarters during the early hours of
December 5, 1990, looking for
Colonel Eduardo Herrera, who
had escaped by helicopter from a
Naos Island jail outside the city.
Just as they were about to leave the
building, who should arrive? None
other than Herrera himself, in
search of reinforcements to accompany him on a march to the country's Asamblea Legislativabuilding.
Following an armed stand-off between the two sides, Herrera was apprehended by US troops called in
by the panicky military advisers.

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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Watch Out, No. 2
Japanese trading companies may
be the biggest winners in the
hemispheric race to link markets
through free-trade agreements.
Originally dedicated to the exchange of goods between Japan
and Latin America, the companies
are increasingly sending their trade
to third parties. One such company, Mitsui, now directs 33% of its
trade to third parties. The company conducts $2 billion annually
in trade for its Latin American
operations.

Haven't They Read Adam Smith?
The hand that guides Latin America's emerging "free markets" may
not be so invisible after all. In a
WashingtonPost article (December
2, 1990), reporter Eugene Robinson dismisses the free-market
policies of many of the region's
countries as a "veneer." He writes
that "Underneath lies an ingrained
system of winks, nods, kickbacks,
bribes and outright corruption that
will take many years to root out."

Don't Judge a Banana by Its Peel
Commonwealth Caribbean bananas have long enjoyed privileged
access to the British market, where
75% of the fruit consumed is from
the region. When the single European market becomes a reality in
1992, bananas from Latin America
will threaten the Caribbean's privileged position. According to the
FinancialTimes (December 13,
1990), Caribbean producers are
worried--especially because the
quality of fruit exported to Britain
in 1990 "was the worst since 1987."
Particularly troubling are spots on
the banana peel that give the Caribbean variant an "inferior look."
Though Caribbean producers
counter that their product is better tasting, they know that "for
someone to get at this superiortasting fruit, he first has to peel it,
but if the peel is unattractive, it
does not get open...."

E

Division of Labor
Amid the chaos of Peruvian politics, it seems the country's guerrilla
groups have now divided their targets. According to the Latin American Report (December 1990)
published by the Anti-Defamation
League of the B'nai B'rith, the
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac
Amaru has been targeting synagogues andJewish-owned businesses in Lima. Meanwhile, Sendero
Luminoso guerrillas have targeted
evangelicals throughout the country and are allegedly responsible
for the deaths of some 300 evangelical pastors during the 1980s.

Tread on Me
The Journalof Commerce (January
14, 1991) reports that Brazilian
businesses will take advantage of a
new open-door trade policy to
import used tires from the US and
Europe. One company, StarAm, expects to import between 35,000
and 100,000 tires in 1991. The economics of the transaction make
sense. New tires retail in Brazil for
$50 each. The same tire, used,
costs $3.00 in US markets. Adding
freight and a 20% duty, the tires
cost $9 each in Brazil. Even if retreaded tires sell for about $20, it
will mean a substantial savings for
Brazilian consumers.

agreement between the two countries were established. US products
most likely to benefit are cotton,
soybean oil, soy meal, barley, seeds,
meat, dry milk, and sugar. Currently, imports of these products
are limited because of a 15% acrossthe-board duty. The report notes
that Chilean exporters are wary of
any agreement, since the elimination of US tariffs, averaging 2-5%,
would not have much impact.

I'll Take the High Ground
Hurricane forecasting is a delicate
art at best. Yet we are now told by
Professor William M. Gray of Colorado State University that "the incidence of intense hurricanes
making landfall on the US coast
and in the Caribbean basin will
likely increase during the 1990s
and early years of the 21st century
to levels of activity greater than
were observed in the 1970s and
1980s" (Science, September 1990,
pp. 1251-56). Gray observes that
variation in intense hurricane activity is closely linked to variation in
summer rainfall in the Sahel region of West Africa. An apparent
break in the Sahel's 18-year
drought pattern during 1988-89
portends a higher probability for
hurricanes during this decade.

Finally, Something to Celebrate
Who Wins, Who Loses?
A report by the US commercial
section in Chile suggests that US
farm exports to the country could
increase between $5 million and
$15 million a year if a free-trade

Amid patriotic flag-waving and
marimba music, the Dominican Republic defeated Venezuela 13-1 to
win the Caribbean Baseball Series
on February 9, 1991, in Miami's
Bobby Maduro Stadium. The
Miami Herald(February 10, 1991)

reported that a nine-run explosion
scored by the island team in the
first inning left Dominican fans
"giddy, [and] dancing gleefully in
front of their seats near the third
base line."

New-Age Marxism?
CheddiJagan, die-hard Marxist
and long-time leader of the
People's Progressive Party of Guyana, visited Miami in December
1990 to proclaim his new approach
to government. Speaking before a
forum organized by local Guyanese
supporters, the US-trained dentist
illustrated a keen grasp on the state
of the world. Urging US intervention to assure free and fair elections in 1991, and pushing free
enterprise and foreign investment,
his message could not have been
better received. His audience? A
group of local Republican Party
members.

On the Move
Bill Perrin, formerly deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian affairs of the Department of State, has been named
executive director of the InterAmerican Foundation. Perrin was
US ambassador to Cyprus in 198789, and during his tenure the embassy received an award as one of
the most efficiently run US missions in the world. Perrin has also
served as the Peace Corps' regional
director for Africa, its director for
the Eastern Caribbean, and between 1982 and 1984, as the Peace
Corps' director for Belize.
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Free Trade: Can Mexico Win?
by Steven E. Sanderson

of the multilateral

Sith

GATT
the (General
collapse
Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade)
negotiations in
Brussels on December 7, 1990, the
spotlight turned to free-trade negotiations between the US and Mexico. The prospect of a free-trade
agreement is the current focus of
US-Mexican relations, overshadowing drugs, immigration, and other
bilateral issues. This attention is remarkable because formal free-trade
negotiations have yet to be authorized by the US Congress and are
unlikely to take shape before the
spring of 1991. Since free trade was
inaugurated as a policy prospect
during President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari's visit to Washington in
the spring of 1990, excitement has
been generated without a clearly articulated set of goals for the agreement. Congressional hearings,
newspaper features, presidential
visits, and animated lobbying have
Steven E. Sanderson is professor ofpolitical science and directorof the Tropical
Conservationand Development Program at the Centerfor Latin American
Studies, University ofFlorida.He is a
member of Hemisphere's editorialadvisory board.His most recent book is
The Politics of Trade in Latin
American Development (Stanford
University Press,forthcoming).
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all begun on the basis of a provocative but hardly novel idea.
In spite of the high profile enthusiasm of the Bush and Salinas
administrations, significant Mexican and US opposition to free
trade cannot be discounted. For
instance, US trade unions categorically oppose the free-trade agreement on grounds that the bilateral
relationship will be a cause of lost
jobs in the US. The unions contend that a broad agreement would
"do little to improve the lives of
Mexican workers" and would "encourage greater capital outflows
further harming
from the US
the US industrial base" (AFL-CIO
Executive Council, May 24, 1990)
In the US House of Representatives, opposition has turned into a
nascent movement to deny President Bush fast-track authority for
the negotiations. Meanwhile, agricultural producer groups in Florida, Texas, and California worry
about lost markets. From automobiles to textiles and winter vegetables, such concerns echo in the
antechamber of the free-trade talks.
Opposition in Mexico is less articulate because of the nature of
the country's public policy process
and the fragmented condition of
political opposition so far Much of
Salinas's foreign economic policy is
consistent with rightist political
goals, and the popular base of left
opposition alternatives has been
without voice in official Mexican

politics for at least the past decade.
The Cuauhtemoc Cirdenas camp
is forming an alternative nationalist political voice, but it has not
been as visible or as coherent as
the Salinas government's call for
free trade. Yet the quiescence of
high profile opposition should not
delude policymakers into thinking
that Mexico is at one with the
Salinas government on the freetrade issue.
The endorsement of a freetrade agreement by the executives
of both countries and its appeal to
the policymaking public are appropriate indicators of two sets of
change: the economic transformation occurring in Mexico and US
efforts to make bilateral policies
reflect a special relationship with
"our neighbor to the south." The
Salinas government considers free
trade to be its best bet for national
economic recovery. For the Bush
administration, it is a flashy fallback strategy, after eight years of
GATT negotiations have crumbled.
Free trade is the most pressing dimension of a regional strategy laid
out in Bush's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, which calls for
a free-trade area "from Alaska to
Antarctica." And it builds on the
much invoked but little observed
"special relationship" between
Washington and Mexico City (see
"Congress Responds," p. 19)
However appealing the idea
of US-Mexican free trade, little is

Hemisphere
urity interest has emtions to enhance the
economic stability in

A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIR S

Provoking debate on the region'sproblems, initiativesand achievements
Providingan zntellectual bridge between the concernedpublics
of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.

ent proposal for freeations with Mexico has
me of the old lanEconomic Committee
October 1990 were
ferences to the need
nomic progress with

he free-trade agreetor Bob Graham (D-FL)
a for "domestic underthe importance of
ican economic growth
1 stability on important
is country." A freement, however, implicinst that grain because
underwrite and accelerof "dynamic instability"
hat has been the nature
politics all along.
nge is appropriate, peroverdue. The reason is
A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIR S
>spects for progressive
exico are tied directly
willingness
to confront
Provoking debate on the region'sproblems, initiativesand achievements
nsformation, with all
ty that might imply.
Providingan intellectualbridge between the concernedpublics
g on economically
of North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.
eans not only the
x" of external stabilization and effective exchange-rate
was, after all, Mexico that was held
tion, free trade, structural adjustmanagement. Moreover, represenup as the hemispheric "red menment, and privatization. It also
tatives of the US textile workers'
ace" during the country's revolumeans messy and unpredictable
unions have raised questions about
tionary period (1910-34) US
political change, which will call on
the size of potential markets in
security policy in the 1920s inthe US to revisit its foreign policy
Mexico for US exports of fabric
cluded the exhortation not to allow
goals concerning Mexico.
and apparel. While proponents of
The leading edge of the US role
Cuba or Nicaragua to become "the
free trade wax poetic about a Mexinext Mexico." In the postwar era,
is the trade relationship. Drugs, imcan market of 85 million, effective
migration, and other issues now
the US government combined
demand may be limited to a popusecurity against communism with
trail the free-trade bandwagon.
lation of 8 million. With 21 million
economic development as its two
But, just as trade cannot be the
Mexicans living beneath the World
pillars of foreign policy toward
only denominator of US foreign
Bank poverty level, the depth of
Mexico. At least since the Kennedy
economic policy toward Mexican
the Mexican market is open to
administration's initiatives to proliberalization, stability cannot moquestion.
nopolize Washington's thinking
mote free trade with Mexico, US

Hemisphere

Hemisphere

Winter/Spring 1991

17

E
Subscribe now to Hemisphere!

Free Tr

1 Year (3 Issues):
2 Years (6 Issues):

O $20 US, Canada, PR, USVI

O $27 elsewhere

O $36 US, Canada, PR, USVI

O $50 elsewhere

by Steven E. Sanderson
Name

Address
City/State/Province/Zip
Country

Please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to:
Hemisphere
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
Miami, FL 33199
ith the co
of the mu

GATT (G
Agreemel
Tariffs an
negotiatic
Brussels on December 7,
spotlight turned to free-t.
tiations between the US
ico. The prospect of a fre
agreement is the current
US-Mexican relations, ov
ing drugs, immigration, <
bilateral issues. This attel
markable because formal
negotiations have yet to i
ized by the US Congress
unlikely to take shape be
spring of 1991 Since fret
inaugurated as a policy p
during President Carlos .
Gortari's visit to Washing
the spring of 1990, excite
been generated without
ticulated set of goals for the agreement. Congressional hearings,
newspaper features, presidential
visits, and animated lobbying have

Steven E. Sanderson is professor ofpolitical science and directorof the Tropical
Conservationand Development Program at the Centerfor Latin American
Studies, University ofFlorida.He is a
member of Hemisphere's editorialadvisory board.His most recent book is
The Politics of Trade in Latin
American Development (Stanford
University Press,forthcoming).
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cultural producer groups in Florida, Texas, and California worry
about lost markets. From automobiles to textiles and winter vegetables, such concerns echo in the
antechamber of the free-trade talks.
Opposition in Mexico is less articulate because of the nature of
the country's public policy process
and the fragmented condition of
political opposition so far Much of
Salinas's foreign economic policy is
consistent with rightist political
goals, and the popular base of left
opposition alternatives has been
without voice in official Mexican

economic recovery. I or the Bush
administration, it is a flashy fallback strategy, after eight years of
GATT negotiations have crumbled.
Free trade is the most pressing dimension of a regional strategy laid
out in Bush's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, which calls for
a free-trade area "from Alaska to
Antarctica." And it builds on the
much invoked but little observed
"special relationship" between
Washington and Mexico City (see
"Congress Responds," p. 19)
However appealing the idea
of US-Mexican free trade, little is

S

known about its possible dimensions or effects. A free-trade agreement could instigate revolutionary
changes in Mexico, precisely because of the special-or as many
Mexicans might describe it, inexorable-relationship between Mexico
and the US, and because of their
tremendous difference in size. The
US implications could be immediate, if less systemic. An agreement's
impact would likely be felt in Mexican labor markets that provide new
migrants to the US. It could literally transform the Mexican landscape by changing the structure
of agriculture. It could swallow a
border industry program that has
grown to 1,700 firms and 500,000
employees. And it is far from outrageous to suggest that free trade
could bear directly on the future
stability of Mexico's political system
and thereby US national security interests as well. Accordingly both
countries should undertake negotiations with a serious appreciation
of the stakes.
It is easy, nonetheless, to overestimate the impact of a free-trade
agreement. Many economists concede that free trade may mean little to Mexican development
without adequate fiscal intervention and effective exchange-rate
management. Moreover, representatives of the US textile workers'
unions have raised questions about
the size of potential markets in
Mexico for US exports of fabric
and apparel. While proponents of
free trade wax poetic about a Mexican market of 85 million, effective
demand may be limited to a population of 8 million. With 21 million
Mexicans living beneath the World
Bank poverty level, the depth of
the Mexican market is open to
question.

Little is clear about the specifics
or timing of a free-trade agreement. Still, the long-standing nature of US-Mexican relations and
the "creeping integration" of the
last decade make the context of
the negotiations fairly clear At this
early stage, it is critical to sketch
some likely dimensions-and bellwethers of success or failure.

The Security Connection
The US government has traditionally viewed developments in Mexico as a national security matter It
was, after all, Mexico that was held
up as the hemispheric "red menace" during the country's revolutionary period (1910-34) US
security policy in the 1920s included the exhortation not to allow
Cuba or Nicaragua to become "the
next Mexico." In the postwar era,
the US government combined
security against communism with
economic development as its two
pillars of foreign policy toward
Mexico. At least since the Kennedy
administration's initiatives to promote free trade with Mexico, US

national security interest has emphasized actions to enhance the
political and economic stability in
Mexico.
The current proposal for freetrade negotiations with Mexico has
borrowed some of the old language.Joint Economic Committee
hearings in October 1990 were
filled with references to the need
to marry economic progress with
stability in the free-trade agreement. Senator Bob Graham (D-FL)
issued a plea for "domestic understanding of the importance of
Latin American economic growth
and political stability on important
issues for this country." A freetrade agreement, however, implicitly goes against that grain because
it will surely underwrite and accelerate the sort of "dynamic instability"
in Mexico that has been the nature
of Mexican politics all along.
This change is appropriate, perhaps even overdue. The reason is
that the prospects for progressive
change in Mexico are tied directly
to Mexico's willingness to confront
systemic transformation, with all
the instability that might imply.
What is going on economically
in Mexico means not only the
"proper mix" of external stabilization, free trade, structural adjustment, and privatization. It also
means messy and unpredictable
political change, which will call on
the US to revisit its foreign policy
goals concerning Mexico.
The leading edge of the US role
is the trade relationship. Drugs, immigration, and other issues now
trail the free-trade bandwagon.
But, just as trade cannot be the
only denominator of US foreign
economic policy toward Mexican
liberalization, stability cannot monopolize Washington's thinking
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about long-term bilateral security
interests. Two elements that betray
serious US misunderstanding of
the perils of free trade are oil and
immigration.

Playing the Oil Card
Since the mid-1970s Mexico has
been a major actor in international
oil markets, the largest Latin American exporter outside OPEC, and a
free rider on OPEC international
price management. The US has
viewed Mexican oil as an opportunity to secure oil sources outside of
the OPEC system, and as a sort of
barter vehicle for US support of
the Mexican government in hard
times. As one example, the Reagan
administration's 1982-83 "bailout"
of Mexico in the first wave of the
debt crisis involved advance purchase of Mexican oil when US
supplies were abundant. The
free-trade initiative complicates
Mexico's opportunity to trade on
its oil with the US, and may actually
undermine the long-term ability of
the US to take advantage of Mexican oil (see "A Mexican Agenda,"

1990), the Mexican government
estimates investment requirements
for oil over the next five years to
reach a stunning $48 billion. Despite Mexico's economic stagnation of the 1980s, its domestic
demand has been growing at 7%
per year Even without the added
energy demands of a free-trade
agreement, Mexico will be hard
pressed to meet its domestic needs
at a reasonable price.

Feet People

p. 2 1 ) Why is this so?

First, if Mexico becomes integrated into a unified North American market, domestic Mexican
energy demands will increase
apace. A higher proportion of oil
production will go to domestic industries and modern agriculture,
to fuel any of the economic scenarios now envisioned under the freetrade agreement. Such a prognosis
leaves less oil for export to the US,
thus bringing general US-Mexican
relations into policy conflict with
specific oil-based security policies.
Second, Mexico may be unable
to satisfy both domestic demand
and foreign exchange requirements met by oil exports without
increasing capital investment in
PEMEX, the state oil monopoly.
PEMEX production is holding
steady at about 2.5 million barrels
per day, but some analysts project a
decline to 1.5 million over the next
decade. According to the Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly (January 15,
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The US is focused on Mexican
oil-especially since the Persian
Gulf Crisis-and has become more
insistent on opening Mexican oil to
the free-trade negotiations. The Salinas government, meanwhile, has
not yet compromised its commitment to a national oil industry. It is
unclear, however, that either side is
appreciative of the stakes of the oil
game. Is the US viewing oil as part
of a larger security dimension of
the talks? Has the US considered
the likely shifts in the oil sector
that would likely accompany bilateral integration?

The supply side of this problem
could be partly addressed by opening PEMEX to foreign investment,
as has already occurred to some extent in petrochemicals. But Mexico
risks major political upheaval if it
opens PEMEX to foreign investors,
in light of the symbolic-indeed,
constitutional-importance of the
national mineral patrimony. Capital for investment in oil may not appear unless concessions to foreign
investors are made. Therein lies
the problem: in order to fulfill oneof the most important bilateral
security roles envisioned for
Mexico, its oil monopoly must be
opened to foreign involvement proscribed by both the revolutionary
constitution of 1917 and the tradition of oil legislation since. Further, the prospect of nationalist
opposition to a large wave of foreign direct investment is not restricted to oil.

Practically since the beginning of
modern Mexico, the country has
exchanged labor with its neighbors: exports of workers to the US,
imports of workers from Central
America and the Caribbean, and
many other variations on this
theme. For its part, the US has
sought to control the flow of undocumented workers into the US
from Mexico, through border interdiction, official immigration reforms, and guest worker programs.
It is commonly accepted on both
sides of the border that official policies are inadequate to La Raza's estimated 2-3 million Mexicans living
illegally in the US or to those who
travel back and forth. The US
government-sponsored Asencio
Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development
(1990) characterizes trade as "the
single most important long-term
remedy to the problem."
In fact, trade may not be the
solution, but rather a further aggravation of the problem. The
Asencio Commission correctly
observed that the short-term effect
of a free-trade agreement would
probably be an increasein labor
flows from Mexico to the US. In
the long term, according to the
Commission, trade will diminish
the flow of Mexican labor to the
US. Is this long-term prediction
well-founded?

Salinas has requested that
immigration, or "labor flows," be
included in the free-trade negotiations. The US government, when
asked about Salinas's statement
that oil not be included in the negotiations, said that "It is premature to take things off the table"
(Bureau of National Affairs, June
27, 1990) In the same breath, however, the US rejected the Mexican
view that labor flows across the border should be discussed. "Labor is
factors of pronot a trade item
duction are not trade issues."
A look at European Community
(EC) expansion shows that labor
flows can be very much a part of
tighter economic integration
through trade. In the course of
EC expansion, the slow, phased integration of Greece, Portugal, and
Spain addressed the potential problem of labor flows from South to
North. It also paid adjustment assistance to ensure that domestic economic opportunities ameliorated
the prospect of huge labor outflows from the poorer nations.
Many differences stand in the way
of generalizing from the EC case.
Nevertheless, there is no reason to
categorically reject the potential
for labor migration, especially in
light of the tremendous labor-force
adjustment likely in a US-Mexican
free-trade agreement.
But does US rejection or acceptance of migration issues make a
difference? Yes, in the formal sense
of making progress on a variety of
labor issues of particular importance to the Mexican government.
To say that labor is not a trade item
is to misunderstand completelyor to deny disingenuously-the
connection between the structure
and potential of the Mexican economy and the stock and flow of workers wishing to migrate to the US.
Whether or not the US and Mexico
consider immigration as part of the
trade agenda, the tremendous
"labor-force adjustment" in Mexico
that must accompany any significant free-trade agreement will express itself partly as Mexican
workers in the US.
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Former president Ronald
Reagan, trying to scare the US public into acceptance of US military
involvement in Central America,
invoked the specter of "feet people," terrestrial versions of the benighted boat people. Negotiators
could do well to consider such agricultural "factors of production,"
who may become the agricultural
and environmental feet people of
the future.

Maize and the Multilateral
Shadow
It is difficult to tell what the specific effects of trade liberalization
will be on Mexican rural life. One
of the most popular ways of discussing the issue of trade liberalization's benefits to a country in the
multilateral system is to model its
impact on domestic economic welfare. Dale Hathaway's analysis of agricultural trade policy cites Mexico
as the only country studied in Latin
America where global free-trade
conditions would cause producer
welfare to deteriorate. The analysis
predicts that, if rich Western countries alone were to liberalize markets, and if Mexico were not to
reciprocate, then Mexico's producer welfare would improve, but
its consumer welfare would worsen.
Mexico is so different from the
rest of Latin America on this score
because of the deep, historical connection of agriculture to its rural
social policy. Agricultural subsidies
in Mexico have been directly connected to the rural wage. The
prices of maize, bean, and other
basic foods are a straightforward indicator of poor farmer welfare. Insofar as the Mexican government
has supported the prices of basic
food production at an adequate
level, it has enabled poor campesinos to survive in the countryside.
Thus, rural living conditions immediately deteriorated with the removal of input and farm-gate price
supports over the past several years.
What does this have to do with
bilateral trade? Consider that in
1988 nearly two-thirds of ejidatarios
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(roughly, public-sector poor farmers) planted maize as their principal crop, even after six years of
reduced subsidies and destatization
of the rural economy. Although
maize production in Mexico is not
price competitive with the US, it
continues because of broad publicsector support. Open to free trade,
how many of those 2 million or so
poor rural producers-and their
families-would be sacrificed to
market rationality? Where would
they go for their livelihoods?

are likely to fall by the wayside. The
reason would be either competitive
US exports of basic grains and oil
seeds, or market-mandated shifts to
cash crops they cannot exploit.
This issue, however, has not made
it onto the official agenda, and the
testimony and literature supporting free-trade conveniently leaves it
out of the discussion.
Still, Mexican exporters of
fresh fruits and vegetables have
succeeded because of the incorporation of advanced technology and
inputs into a cheap labor market
with ready access to an expanding
US consumer market. Under conditions of free trade, one might
reasonably expect more winter
vegetable, table grape, and other
fruit production to move from the
US to Mexico, particularly if the
US removes its own agricultural
subsidy programs and faces increasing competition for inputs such as
water. In the words of a California
agricultural consultant, "You're
going to see more movement in agriculture southward from California as water becomes scarcer, and
as issues of fertilizer use, high land
costs and potential labour shortages loom larger" (Euromoney,

September 1989).
Now that the GATT negotiations have failed, agricultural trade
talks have taken on a hemispheric
focus, with the Mexican negotiations in the lead. Mexico, after all,
is regularly among the top three or
four agricultural trade partners of
the US, and European consolidation and agricultural protectionism
add importance to Mexico as a US
market. Before the debt crisis and
Salinastroika, the only barriers between poor smallholders and
ejidatariosweredomestic market
protection from imports and the
maintenance of farm incomes
through expensive subsidies. The
subsidies are well along on the
slide to elimination. If negotiations
insist on freer trade in agriculture,
then maize, bean, sorghum, and
squash producers in central Mexico, along with their food producing counterparts on richer land,

This prospect is tempered by
recent findings that winter vegetables are slightly more expensive to
produce in Mexico than in the US.
Also pertinent is the relative stability of Mexico's market share in
winter vegetables over the past
15 years, despite competitive devaluations, technological innovation,
and relatively free markets. Such
stability raises questions about the
general boon to Mexican agriculture of a free-trade agreement. In
any event, the promise of fresh
fruit and vegetable exports for Mexican economic development is energy intensive, resource limited,
and broadly responsible for some
of the worst agricultural abuses of
Mexico's environment.
The potential for Mexican
exports to play a role in US food
policy in times of inflation is well
established. It became especially ap-

some movement away trom mvexican production of food crops for
domestic consumption to production of more remunerative crops
for the US market. Mexico is already moving away from water
resource subsidization, which will
bolster the position of large agribusiness.
Using history as a guide, the
political tensions of agricultural
free trade are detrimental to both
the US and Mexico. For more than
a decade, Florida agriculturalists
and their representatives have
been railing against initiatives for
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invoked the specter of "feet people," terrestrial versions of the benighted boat people. Negotiators
could do well to consider such agricultural "factors of production,"
who may become the agricultural
and environmental feet people of
the future.
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It is difficult to tell what the specific effects of trade liberalization
will be on Mexican rural life. One
of the most popular ways of discussing the issue of trade liberalization's benefits to a country in the
multilateral system is to model its
impact on domestic economic welfare. Dale Hathaway's analysis of agricultural trade policy cites Mexico
as the only country studied in Latin
America where global free-trade
conditions would cause producer
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predicts that, if rich Western countries alone were to liberalize markets, and if Mexico were not to
reciprocate, then Mexico's producer welfare would improve, but
its consumer welfare would worsen.
Mexico is so different from the
rest of Latin America on this score
because of the deep, historical connection of agriculture to its rural
social policy. Agricultural subsidies
in Mexico have been directly connected to the rural wage. The
prices of maize, bean, and other
basic foods are a straightforward indicator of poor farmer welfare. Insofar as the Mexican government
has supported the prices of basic
food production at an adequate
level, it has enabled poor campesinos to survive in the countryside.
Thus, rural living conditions immediately deteriorated with the removal of input and farm-gate price
supports over the past several years.
What does this have to do with
bilateral trade? Consider that in
1988 nearly two-thirds of ejidatarios
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(roughly, public-sector poor farmers) planted maize as their principal crop, even after six years of
reduced subsidies and destatization
of the rural economy. Although
maize production in Mexico is not
price competitive with the US, it
continues because of broad publicsector support. Open to free trade,
how many of those 2 million or so
poor rural producers--and their
families---would be sacrificed to
market rationality? Where would
they go for their livelihoods?

Now that the GATT negotiations have failed, agricultural trade
talks have taken on a hemispheric
focus, with the Mexican negotiations in the lead. Mexico, after all,
is regularly among the top three or
four agricultural trade partners of
the US, and European consolidation and agricultural protectionism
add importance to Mexico as a US
market. Before the debt crisis and
Salinastroika,the only barriers between poor smallholders and
ejidatariosweredomestic market
protection from imports and the
maintenance of farm incomes
through expensive subsidies. The
subsidies are well along on the
slide to elimination. If negotiations
insist on freer trade in agriculture,
then maize, bean, sorghum, and
squash producers in central Mexico, along with their food producing counterparts on richer land,

uations, technological innovation,
and relatively free markets. Such
stability raises questions about the
general boon to Mexican agriculture of a free-trade agreement. In
any event, the promise of fresh
fruit and vegetable exports for Mexican economic development is energy intensive, resource limited,
and broadly responsible for some
of the worst agricultural abuses of
Mexico's environment.
The potential for Mexican
exports to play a role in US food
policy in times of inflation is well
established. It became especially ap-

parent in the days of the Carter administration, which was whipsawed
by the so-called "Florida Tomato
War" with Mexico and high inflation in the US. Federal officials in
the US considered expanded Mexican production to be part of an
overall bilateral relationship and
part of the policy tool kit available
to keep consumer prices down.
There are new opportunities to
take advantage of Mexico's export
potential to serve the US economy.
As happened in the past, however,
critical issues of adjustment and sustainability are being understated.
Without trouble, Florida could
be substituted for California in the
quote about the southward relocation of agriculture. The Florida
Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services has already petitioned the US government to exempt Florida's $1.5 billion winter
vegetable and $6 billion citrus industries from a free-trade agreement (Tampa Tribune, December
12, 1990). Obviously, free trade suggests an adjustment problem on
the US side of the border, but the
environmental damage done by
Florida, Texas, and California agriculture has been significant. Adjustment away from Florida produce
would also mean tremendous pressures on land and water in Mexico.
While it would be foolhardy to predict specific outcomes, it is not unreasonable to expect the following
shifts: higher land prices in Mexico; more competition for water in
Mexico's rich river valleys; and
some movement away from Mexican production of food crops for
domestic consumption to production of more remunerative crops
for the US market. Mexico is already moving away from water
resource subsidization, which will
bolster the position of large agribusiness.
Using history as a guide, the
political tensions of agricultural
free trade are detrimental to both
the US and Mexico. For more than
a decade, Florida agriculturalists
and their representatives have
been railing against initiatives for
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free trade with Mexico in competitive produce. At the height of the
tomato war, Florida's agriculture
commissioner Doyle Conner even
warned that "a Mexican tomato
OPEC" would undermine the wellbeing of the US public. Mexico has
never held a tomato to the throat
of the West, and imports have
never drastically reduced the US
market share.
For Mexico, the prospect of
freer trade in winter vegetables
means greater "technological
equalization" across the border.
That is, Mexican producers would
compete by adopting additional international technology while relying on the low price of labor to
give them a slight international
edge. So far, this process has
meant the economic dislocation
of poor campesinos. It has encouraged greater internal migration in
Mexico, as vegetable producers prefer not to use local workers. It has
also caused increased farming on
hillsides and other fragile land;
emigration from countryside to
city, and from the Mesa Centralto
the northern border; and additional crowding in Mexico's nonfarm employment sectors.

Transnational Integration by
Maquiladoras
One focus of free-trade talks is the
so-called maquiladoras,shorthand
for the "in-bond" industries that
grew out of the Border Industrialization Program and its successors.
Maquiladorashave grown tremendously, especially since exchangerate policy in Mexico made border
investment more attractive. From
employing scarcely 4,000 employees in 57 plants in 1966, the industries have grown to employ roughly
a half million Mexicans in 1991.
In recent years, policies governing
industrial location have been relaxed, and 20% of the maquiladoras
now locate in Mexico's interior.
US economist Rudiger Dornbusch notes that the Mexican
government's restructuring plan
assumes an ability to run a large
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current-account surplus to simultaneously finance its foreign debt
and economic growth. He observes
that the government is counting
on maquiladoraexports to continue
growing at their current rate, well
in excess of all other exports.

A free-trade agreement will
make the "in-bond" industries redundant as a trade category, just as
they become central to the hopes
for Mexican industrial integration
with the North. If overall tariffs
and quantitative restrictions on the
US side are reduced, the special tariff sections that make the status of
maquiladorasspecial will diminish
as well. If Mexicans are allowed to
import freely from the US, the "inbond" provisions that foreclose
domestic sale of maquila goods in
Mexico will become unnecessary.
Several concerns have arisen in
regard to the "liberation" of the
maquilaindustries, and the integration of Mexican industry in general. For one, transnational
suppliers such as Japan or US
suppliers gone south might well
"crowd out" Mexican suppliers.
This depends on the nature of domestic content rules and the adaptability of Mexican suppliers to the
challenges of industrial modernization along international lines.
Nevertheless, transnationals could
either crowd out domestic competitors or turn them into "clones" of
their suppliers in other countries.

Mexicans worry that a free-trade
agreement would offer an opening
for the effective transnationalization of Mexican industry, as well as
a surrender of the complicated requirements that seek to balance
the industrial imports and exports.
US businesses have already suggested that one of the virtues of
free-trade is Mexico's potential to
become an "export trampoline" to
the rest of Latin America. Yet US
businesses, particularly in the apparel and automobile industries,
worry that the Japanese and other
foreign interests would take similar
advantage of Mexico as a gateway
to the US market.
The environmental impact of
the regional relocation of maquiladoras away from the border (or the
more likely location of new firms
away from the border) is another
basic concern. Official Mexican
encouragement of this process
responds not only to the positive
need for broadening the Mexican
industrial labor market, but to the
horrendous environmental impact
of industrial growth in Mexico's
largest cities. Compliance with environmental regulations in Mexico
is occasional, and many in the Mexican government continue to view
protection of the environment as
"a luxury." US industries and the
border industries themselves are
hardly models of environmental
sensitivity; they regularly cite the
high cost of environmental protection and threaten to move away
from countries with stringent environmental regulations. Market
competition pushes private industry to seek the lowest common
denominator in environmental pollution. In Mexico that denominator is very low indeed, since the
fiscal, administrative, and legal
wherewithal to protect the environment are in short supply.
Other grave concerns involve
the degree to which foreign investors bear their share of the fiscal
burden of government services and
the provision of public goods in
areas where they have high impact.
The Salinas administration wants

desperately to attract direct foreign
investment, which runs counter to
the government's ability to demand high tax rates from multinationals, or from capital in general.
Traditionally known for low tax
rates and widespread tax evasion,
the Mexican state's ability to garner fiscal resources from the private sector is extremely limited.
This weakness results in heavier reliance on traditional taxpayers (i.e.,
potential increases in the income
tax and taxes on savings), and on
attempts to increase public revenues through greater enforcement
of existing tax codes.
Finally, the cross-regional integration of the maquiladorasin Mexico will undoubtedly create more
pressure to supply domestic petroleum and gas at subsidized pricesa key source of Mexico's industrial
competitiveness over the past decade. It will also create pressure in

N

the US to legislate against such "upstream subsidies," a recurring issue
in Congress.

High Stakes
This analysis has not considered
the necessary complications of
bringing the Canadians into a trilateral free-trade agreement. Nor
has it considered the wider hemispheric and global implications.
Such matters aside, the impact
of a free-trade agreement will be
grossly different in the US and Mexico. The adjustment in the US will
be modest, though specific sectors
such as textiles and steel will likely
feel the blow. Rural incomes policy
in the US does not ride on free
trade, as it does in Mexico. Political
stability and presidential succession
in the US are not at issue; in Mexico, no less an ideological battle
than neoliberalism versus populist

E
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nationalism is engaged.
Clearly Mexico's stakes in a freetrade agreement are extraordinarily high: the Salinas government
must deliver on its model of liberalization, or the succeeding administration will face a newly resurgent
economic nationalism. And the
wage share of any free-trade agreement must allow the social impact
of free trade to be progressive.
How that can be accomplished is
unclear, since the "success" of Mexican liberalization has been based
on suppressing consumer demand,
competitively devaluing the peso,
and crushing the real wage. It is
not unreasonable to say that the entire Mexican economic program is
built on virtually unrestricted integration with the international economy, led by the US. Nonetheless,
the proof of the soundness of such
integration for the Mexican population has yet to be demonstrated. *
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supporting Central Americans' efforts for human rights,

socialjustice, and democracy by providing:
Resources on Central America

Central America in Context
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Central American Tours

Model Educational Programs
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Free-Trade Lessons from Canada
by Ricardo Grinspun

n 1985 the Canadian government announced its intention
to establish a free-trade agreement with the US. From the
perspective of Brian Mulroney's administration and its
free-trade orientation, there were
two main benefits to be derived
from such an agreement. First, it
would ensure Canadian access to
the US market, thereby fostering
further development of Canada's
natural-resource industries as well
as its export-oriented manufacturing. And second, the competitive
pressures of a unified market
would stimulate an upswing in
the productivity performance of
Canadian industry.
Since the Canada-US Free Trade
Agreement (CUFTA) was implemented in 1988, the results for Canada have been discouraging. To be
sure, Canadian macroeconomic
policy and the current world recession bear a substantial share of the
blame for CUFTA's performance
to this point. Nevertheless, CUFTA
suffers from some basic limitations.
The short-term impact of those

limitations on Canada merits the
attention of Mexican citizens and
policymakers as Mexico enters into
trilateral free-trade negotiations
with the US and Canada.

Market Access
Ricardo Grinspun is assistantprofessor
of economics and a fellow of the Center
for Research on Latin America and the
Caribbeanat York University, Toronto,
Canada.He is currently involved in a
researchproject on the effects offreetrade arrangementsin North America.
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CUFTA provides for a gradual
phasing out of Canadian-US bilateral tariffs over the next ten years.
Although the eventual elimination
of such tariffs may seem impressive, the fact that they were generally low to begin with diminishes

the measure's potential benefit for
Canadian exporters. Some Canadian sectors that suffered from escalating US tariffs, such as those
involved with natural resourcebased products, will benefit. In
these cases, as envisioned by freetrade proponents-the phasing out
of tariffs will encourage further domestic processing of raw materials.
At the other end of the spectrum,
however, are the Canadian sectors
that previously enjoyed highly protective tariffs, such as textile and
furniture manufacturers. For these
sectors, tariff reduction has already
resulted in significant job losses.
Ensuring access to export markets requires the elimination of
both tariff and nontariff obstacles
to trade. Canadian exporters to the
US previously faced a commercial
obstacle course of nontariff impediments, such as red tape, technical
and safety standards, "voluntary"
restraint agreements, export surcharges, countervailing and antidumping duties, and safeguard
measures. CUFTA's assistance in
removing these less obvious barriers has been disappointing.
For one thing, Canada gained
little access to US government procurement-a key objective of Canadian negotiators. For another,
many US and Canadian nontariff
barriers were grandfathered into
CUFTA. Given the Canadian objective of securing access to its main
export markets, the consequences

of such grandfathering have been
extremely negative for Canada. Yet
another problem is that Canada remains vulnerable to future US protectionist policies. On the positive
side, the US and Canada did set up
a dispute-settlement mechanism to
resolve trade disputes. The mechanism's effectiveness, however, is
limited by the fact that it is subordinate to the laws of each country.

Macroeconomic Policy
The short-term effects of the freetrade accord cannot be divorced
from the macroeconomic policies
of the Canadian government. In
this respect, the focus of Canada's
recent macroeconomic policy has
been anti-inflationary. As such it
has promoted high real interest
rates, a wide gap between Canadian and US interest rates, and an
overvalued Canadian dollar. This
anti-inflationary focus has contributed to Canada's current recession. In turn, the recession has
combined with the exchange-rate
imbalance to weaken the international competitiveness of Canadian
industry, seriously hampering the
cornerstone of the government's
CUFTA objectives: investment in
the country's export-oriented
manufacturing.
Together, trade liberalization
and currency overvaluation have increased the Canadian propensity to
spend money on the US side of the
border, which hurts not only Canadian industry but commerce and
services as well. Canadians-most
of whom reside a short distance
from the border-are flocking to
the US in growing numbers to restock on everything from electronics to clothing and gasoline.
This problem seriously restricts the
ability of Canadian firms to restructure their operations in response
to the free-trade agreement.

Productivity, Jobs, and
Investment
Productivity gains-the basis for
economic growth and higher living
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standards--were promised by the
Mulroney administration upon entering into CUFTA negotiations.
Such gains, however, are not being
realized. A key reason is not trade
liberalization per se but rather the
mishandling of macroeconomic
policy by raising interest rates and
overvaluing the Canadian dollar.
This experience shows that the
elimination of trade barriers is not
enough to equalize productivity on
both sides of the border. Indeed,
raising productivity is linked to
policy in a broad array of spheres,
among which are education, job
training, regional development,
research and development, incentives for technological advancement, social programs, and public

Either way, the social cost is
high. CUFIA's supporters envisioned that workers displaced
from sunset industries would be
retrained and shifted to jobs in
export-oriented "sunrise" industries. So far, however, most of the
workers who lose industrial jobs
are not finding new ones: employment in Canadian manufacturing
has dropped by about 10% during
the two years of CUFTA's implementation.

health.
A fundamental problem of
CUFTA is that it restricts Canada's
ability to implement productivityboosting policies in these and related spheres. Why? First, because
US interests regard many of these
policies as "unfair" trade practices,
and CUFTA does not provide
Canada with effective protection
against US countervailing duties.
Second, CUFTA makes Canada
more vulnerable to ongoing US
pressure to "Americanize" Canadian public policies-i.e., to decrease government intervention in
the economy by reducing support
for regional development, social
welfare, and other programs.
Canada's failure to register productivity gains is consistent with
organized labor's vehement opposition to CUFTA. Canadian labor argues that CUFTA encourages the
export of jobs to the US and other
countries, especially from laborintensive, low-skill domestic industries. This prediction is being
fulfilled. Defenders of CUFTA respond by claiming that the restructuring of Canada's economy would
have occurred in any case, due to
the transformation of the world
economy. The truth probably lies
somewhere in between: CUFTA
has not caused, but it certainly has
accelerated, the demise of "sunset"
industries.

28

Hemisphere

Winter/Spring 1991

into subsidiaries of transnational
corporations. Further, many of
these subsidiaries are cutting jobs,
costs, and production, while increasing their volume of imports.
As yet there is no discernible trend
toward opening new plants, implementing new lines of production, or enhancing technological
capacity.
With some degree of validity,
proponents of CUFTA blame this
state of affairs on the economic recession. Still, today's decision to install a new manufacturing plant in,
say, Tijuana or Buffalo instead of
Canada, cannot easily be reversed
in the future. What is more, many
of the plant closings in Canada are
permanent; they will not reopen
when the economy rebounds.

How Will Mexico Fare?

In this context, CUFTA liberalized not only trade but also the
flow of investment. The Canadian
objective was to encourage foreign
direct investment and job creation
in leading edge export-oriented sectors, whose growth would involve
advanced technology as well as research and development operations.
Yet the flow of foreign direct
investment seems to be aimed
much less at the creation of new
productive capacity than at the
takeover and transformation of
existing Canadian-owned firms

Mexico's economy is far less developed than Canada's. Hence, caution must be exercised in making
comparisons. Nevertheless, Mexicans have much to learn from the
Canadian experience when it
comes to trilateral free-trade
negotiations.
Can Mexico expect to gain
secure access to the US market?
The Canadian lesson for Mexico is
clear: gradual tariff elimination will
contribute to secure market access,
but it won't achieve that goal by itself. The majority of Mexican exports to the US already benefit
from low tariffs. The main issue,
then, is nontariff barriers. Regarding such barriers, Mexico is unlikely to obtain any more than
Canada did in key areas like government procurement, trade remedy laws, and relief from future US
protectionism.
Boosting productivity is vital to
Mexico's future. According to the
Canadian case, however, trade liberalization and greater access to
the US market will not necessarily
raise productivity. The Canadian
experience stresses the importance
of implementing policies to improve Mexico's "human capital"such as education, job training,

public health, and workers' rightsas well as to develop its economic
infrastructure in general. As with
Canada, a free-trade agreement
could seriously narrow Mexico's leeway to carry out such policies.
The maquiladoraindustry
demonstrates that the flow of foreign capital into Mexico can foster
the development of physical plants
and facilities, and the creation of
new jobs. Unfortunately the industry also demonstrates that the prospects are grim for investment in
human capital-an indispensable
aspect of economic development.
The evidence includes the sector's
record of generally poor employment conditions and environmental performance, along with the
government's hands-off attitude on
issues of education, health, and social welfare.
Given major differences in the
labor markets of Canada and Mexico, the latter's deepened integration with the North American
economy will probably result in
more jobs for its population, rather
than fewer jobs as in Canada. The
major differences are Mexico's
huge and cheap labor force; absence of independent labor
unions; and lax enforcement of
regulations in the areas of occupational safety, work benefits, and the
environment.
These differences give Mexico a
clear advantage in attracting capital and creating jobs in low-technology, low-skill activities. Yet they also
provide national and international
incentives to maintain an economy
based on cheap labor and conducive to a depressed domestic market, low labor productivity, a large
informal economy, and environmental degradation. Such an economy imposes serious constraints on
long-term economic development
and living standards. In addition,
assembly production activities like
in the maquiladoraare internationally mobile: they can be transferred
to other countries with relative
ease when conditions change.
This vulnerability coincides with
the inadequacy of Mexico's ability
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to finance productive investment.
The reasons are well-known: the
inability of low-income Mexicans
to save; the propensity of wealthy
Mexicans to buy foreign-made luxury items and send their savings
abroad; and the onerous weight of
the debt crisis. The Salinas administration hopes to fill this resource
gap by enticing foreign and expatriated domestic capital through
policy deregulation, inexpensive
labor, and secure access to the
broader North American market.
Unfortunately, as the Canadian
situation indicates, the policy of
liberalizing capital mobility and foreign direct investment is a doubleedged sword. It can augment the
incoming flow of capital, but it can
also promote macroeconomic instability and reinforce subservience to
the decisions made by transnational corporations. There is no
guarantee, moreover, that the augmented flow of capital will be large
enough to offset Mexico's debtbased resource drain.

Looking Inward
Given their differing levels of economic development, the domestic
consequences of a free-trade agreement in Mexico will not simply
mirror those of Canada. Yet, in
speculating on Mexico's economic
future, there is enough in common
to justify some form of comparison.
Mexico's policymakers and citizens
thus have good reason to look at
Canada's economic performance
since the implementation of its
free-trade agreement with the US.
From the Canadian perspective,
Mexico's quest for economic competitiveness through cheap production costs and free-trade
arrangements with its neighbors to
the north is likely to generate new
jobs for Mexicans. It is unlikely,
however, that the strategy will significantly boost Mexico's productivity and living standards during the
1990s. Potentially more beneficial
would be greater emphasis on
strengthening Mexico's economic
and social infrastructure. *
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THE EXPULSION OF MEXICO'S SPANIARDS, 1821-1836
Harold Dana Sims
304 pp. / (3643-7) cloth $42.00

ARGENTINA BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS, 1936-46
Guido di Tella and D. Cameron Watt, Editors
212 pp. / (1159-0) cloth $39.95

CUBAN STUDIES
Volume 20

Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Editor
256 pp. / (3649-6) cloth $32.95

THE SOCIAL DOCUMENTARY INLATIN AMERICA
Julianne Burton, Editor
468 pp. / (3621-6) cloth $49.95
(5419-2) paper $22.95

ASCENT TO BANKRUPTCY

Financing Social Security in Latin America

Carmelo Mesa-Lago
310 pp. / (3600-3) cloth $49.95

THE STATE AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION INLATIN
AMERICA

Volume 2: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela

Christian Anglade and Carlos Fortin, Editors

303 pp. / (1158-2) $34.95

THE ECONOMICS OF CUBAN SUGAR
Jorge F. P6rez-Ldpez
288 pp. / (3663-1) $39.95
Now in paperback

CUBA UNDER THE PLATT AMENDMENT
Louis Perez, Jr.
430 pp. / (5446-X) $16.95
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Space-Age Business Consulting
by Germdn Garrido

The Borderless World: Power
and Strategy in the Interlinked
Economy

What

by Kenichi Ohmae. New York: Harper

Business, 1990. 223 pp. $21.95.

strategy should

guide Latin American firms in a
global economy?
According to re-

capital, goods, and services, which,
according to Ohmae, are growing
as large corporations strive to offset
rising fixed costs by tapping wider
markets. As an example of the geographic complexity of such flows,
when a consumer in, say, Kansas
City, USA, or Kingston,Jamaica,
purchases a Nissan Sentra, he or
she is not-strictly speaking-acquiring a Japanese auto. Although

nowned Japanese
business writer and consultant
Kenichi Ohmae, the answers lie in
Japan's brand of state policy and
transnational corporate manage-

ment, or rather, in his interpretation ofJapan's brand of state policy
and transnational management. Arguably that interpretation revolves
around a premise of virtual hegemony in the global marketplace
that distorts the historical record of
the economic ascent ofJapan and
the "Asian Tigers." From the standpoint of the overwhelming majority
of Latin American business managers, it also relegates the bulk of his
recommendations to the realm of
space-age fantasy.

Towards Global Enterprises
In The Borderless World, Ohmae proposes that "global cities"-such as
Tokyo, New York, and Londonare at the core of the world marketplace of the late 20th century. They
have achieved this status by managing the transnational flows of

Germdn Garridois an executive with
Sintesis Quimica S.A., in Peru, and a
member of the board of SintesisFarmoquimica ColombianaE.M.A., in Colombia. He has master's degrees in
economics and politicalsciencefrom
the University ofPittsburgh.
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they have given rise to a "megaeconomy" whose dynamics transcend the macroeconomic policies
of individual countries.
In place of home-company
subsidiaries, firms must effectively
decentralize their operations, tailoring them to fit the challenging diversity and fluidity of business
climates and consumer preferences around the world. Firms,
then, must develop the flexibility
not only to act as virtual natives in
their numerous geographic and
cultural centers of production and
sales, but also to anticipate changing conditions in these sites. Also
in the setting of a mega-economy,
government policymakers must recognize the obsolescence of nationally grounded concepts such as
fiscal and trade deficit. For instance, regarding balance-of-trade
measures, how should the export
of Toyotas from the US be classified: as a US or Japanese export?

Another World?
the broadest processes of investment, production, and marketing
are orchestrated from Japan, theauto was probably manufactured in
the new Nissan plant in the US
with US labor and with parts produced in Mexico and other countries. Moreover, the advertising
campaign for the auto was likely
drawn up in New York and produced in Los Angeles, while transportation to market and consumer
financing for the sale are likely to
have involved similarly far-flung
networks.
Such worldwide flows erode national frontiers. Ohmae observes
that as such they have rendered
unwieldy the notion of "homecompany subsidiary." In addition

Ohmae emphatically and eloquently asserts that true wealth is
now based primarily on marketsnot on raw materials or fixed assets. He suggests, therefore, that
poor countries can develop economically only by integrating
themselves into the global megaeconomy. Thus, his implicit advice
to Latin American countries is to
eliminate their official barriers to
free trade, since doing so is the
only way Latin American consumers can gain access to the best products and the lowest prices. He adds
that governments must withdraw
from the sphere of economic production, while simultaneously educating their citizens to make wise
market choices.

Ohmae's thinking is not only
simplistic but also contradictory,
particularly concerning the state's
role in national development.
Indeed, countries such as Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and Singapore have developed industrially through vigorous state
intervention. That is, their states
have taken substantial action to
protect infant industries from external competition, construct the infrastructure for manufacturing
growth, and subsidize firms in myriad other ways. Ohmae acknowledges much of this by writing that
"When industries were weak, it
[the Japanese government] pro-

command of the world's leading
firms.
Nonetheless, Latin American
governments are now implementing policies that decidedly favor
the interests of foreign enterprises.
Such policies coincide with the austerity pressures that are pushing
the region's governments to encourage export development in
order to meet their external debt

tected them" (p. 187).
Aside from those associated with
leading corporations in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, Latin American
entrepreneurs tend to see the indiscriminate opening of the region's
markets to global competition as
prejudicial to domestic firms. How
can they possibly compete against
the hegemonic corporations of the
US, Western Europe, and Asia? A
brief comparison with such corporations reveals the competitive
weakness of Latin American firms.
For example, Japan's top 20 companies account for 50% of its exports.
And its top 50 companies account
for 75% ofJapan's exports. Such
companies have enormous power
and reach. By contrast, Peru's top
20 companies account for 10.5%
of a dramatically smaller pool of
exports.
In sum, indiscriminately opening Latin America's borders to
global competition would have
a sweeping result: the demise of
most of the region's domestic manufacturing enterprises. They simply
would not hold their own against
the formidable resources at the

obligations. But can export development through foreign investment substantially strengthen the
economic infrastructure of most
Latin American countries, enabling them to compete successfully
in the long run in the global market? The major problem is that,
with the exception of Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, Latin American
economies lack the size and infrastructure to attract the type of
foreign investment that would generate wide-ranging development in
industry and complementary sectors. It is far more likely that most
Latin American economies will not
only lose their domestic industrial

bases; they will find themselves
scrambling for economic crumbs
as mere labor-intensive export platforms in the highly competitive
global arena.
Even if Latin American firms
were organizationally competitive
with their transnational counterparts, companies in countries such
as Colombia and Peru would be disadvantaged by higher fixed costs
arising from local instability. For instance, Colombian and Peruvian
enterprises incur enormous costs
for the protection of their managers and workers from terrorist
and narcotraffic violence. Surveys
of Peruvian enterprises show that
direct and indirect costs have risen
by 20-25% due to security expenditures.
Not surprisingly, such concerns
do not appear in the pages of The
Borderless World. What Latin American realities call for is something
more creative and complex than
simply opening the gates to transnational corporations. Rather, what
seems to be needed is a strategic
process of reorienting the productive structures of Latin American
countries to the exigencies of global competition. Such a process
would require carefully targeted
measures of government support
in order to foster balanced, selfsustaining national and regional
development.
The dimensions and implications of Ohmae's analysis are
indeed fascinating. Yet, for most
Latin American entrepreneurs and
citizens, the content of The Borderless World is about as far from reality as a Steven Spielberg cinematic
fantasy. .

(Translatedby Hemispherestaff)
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Hemispheric Trade Agreements
by Marian Goslinga

G

eorge Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative proposes to create a free-trade bloc including not only
the US, Canada, and Mexico, but the Caribbean and Central and South America as well. The new union
would stretch from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, encompassing more territory and potentially more volume
than the European Community.
The groundwork for this grandiose proposal has already been partially accomplished. A free-trade agreement was signed between Canada and the US in 1989, and serious trilateral negotiations will soon get under
way between Canada, Mexico, and the US. And the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative has been revised several times
since its inception.
Regional agreements are already in place in Central and South America and could be incorporated into a more extensive union. The Mercado Comzin Centroamericano,the Asociaci6n Latinoamericanode Integraci6n (ALADI, formerly the
Latin American Free Trade Association [LAFTA] ), the Sistema Econdmico Latinoamericano(SELA), the PactoAndino, and
the Tratadode Integracidn, Cooperaci6ny Desarrollo(the 1986 treaty between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) are ready
for a larger framework linking North and South into an economic union.
The following is a list of recent publications on the subject that have appeared in the US and Latin America.
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El acuerdo de libre comercio
entre Canada y Estados Unidos:
lecciones paraAmerica Latina.
Morris Miller. Integracidn Latinoamericana,v. 15, no. 153 (January/
February 1990), p. 24-34. [This
monthly periodical, published by
the Institutopara la Integraci6nde
Amrica Latina in Buenos Aires, is
an excellent source of information
on the process of integration in
Latin America. In addition to scholarly articles, it regularly features
data on regional agencies and
events of topical interest.]

Salm6n. Integraci6nLatinoamericana,v. 15, no. 160 (September
1990), p. 29-37.

Advancing the Goal of a Free
Trade Hemisphere. Kelly Bundy.
Global Trade, v. 110, no. 11 (November 1990), p. 32-34. [Discusses the
pending US-Mexico agreement as
well as the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.]

Canadian-American Trade and
Investment under the Free Trade
Agreement. Harold Crookell. Quorum Books, 1990. 218 p. $42.95.

La armonizaci6n de politicas
econ6micas en el futuro de ALADI.
Marcelo Halperin. Integraci6n
Latinoamericana,v. 15, no. 160
(September 1990), p. 49-57.
Aspectos politicos de la integraci6n
latinoamericana. Osvaldo Hurtado.
Integraci6nLatinoamericana,v. 15,
no. 153 (January/February 1990),
p. 3-8.

ALADI 1980-1990: dificultades
para reorientar un proceso que
empez6 mal.Jaime Quijandria

Caribbean Basin Initiative [Revisions]. CongressionalQuarterly Weekly
Report, v. 48 (August 18, 1990),
p. 2687-89. [A good source of information for treaties/agreements involving the US.]

Marian Goslingais the Latin American and Caribbeanlibrarianat Florida
InternationalUniversity.

CARICOM Countries and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative. Winston
H. Griffith. Latin American Perspectives, v. 17 (Winter 1990), p. 33-54.
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CARICOM Countries and Appropriate Technology. Winston H. Griffith. World Development, v. 18 (June
1990), p. 845-58.
A Case Study of Effects of Developing Country Integration on
Trade Flows: The Andean Pact.
K. Khazeh, D. P. Clark. Journalof
Latin American Studies, v. 22 (May
1990), p. 317-30.
CBI, Other Matters in Conference
[Customs and Trade Act of 1990].
CongressionalQuarterly Weekly Report,
v. 48 (May 19, 1990), p. 1541.
Colonizing Canada: A Year and a
Half of Free Trade. Randy Robinson. MultinationalMonitor, v. 11
(May 1990), p. 10-13.
La cooperaci6n tecnica internacional para el comercio exterior
en America Latina y el Caribe.
Joaquin Izctie. Integraci6nLatinoamericana,v. 15, no. 157 (June
1990), p. 19-34. [Describes the
activities and programs of international and/or regional agencies in
the area.]

La creaci6n del Instituto para la
Integraci6n de America Latina
(INTAL). Gustavo Lagos. Integraci6n Latinoamericana,v. 15, no. 159
(August 1990), p. 5-8. [The author
has been director of INTAL since
its creation in 1969.]
Diez aixos de ALADI: lecciones y
perspectivas. Rubens Antonio Barbosa. Integraci6nLatinoamericana,
v. 15, no. 160 (September 1990),

p. 24-28.
Europa y America Latina: relaciones entre bloques comerciales
en el decenio de 1990. Alfredo

Fuentes Hernindez, Maria Clara
Rueda. Integraci6nLatinoamericana,
.v. 15, no. 161-62 (October/November 1990), p. 3-20. [Analysis of
trade flows between the European
Community and the Asociaci6n
Latinoamericanade Integraci6n.]
The Evolution of Canada as an
Actor in Inter-American Affairs.
James Rochlin. Millennium, v. 19
(Summer 1990), p. 229-48.
An Examination of the Free Trade
Agreement between the United
States and Canada. Satish Chandra.
Tennessee's Business, v. 1 (Spring
1990), p. 15-19.
La experiencia de Europa 1992 y
su influencia en America Latina.
Mario Alejandro Weitz. Integracidn
Latinoamericana,v. 15, no. 155

Human Relations, v. 43 (Fall 1990),
p. 141-67. [About the Caribbean
Basin Initiative.]
Finance Panel Backs Extension of
Caribbean Import Rules. R. D. Elving. CongressionalQuarterly Weekly Report,v. 48 (March 3, 1990), p. 649.
Free Trade, Canada and the
European Challenge. Mihir Bose.
Accountancy (UK), v. 106, no. 1166
(October 1990), p. 101-2. [Compares the US-Canada Free-Trade
Agreement with the European
Common Market.]
The Impact of the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act on Caribbean Nations' Exports and Development.J. Pelzman, G. K. Schoepfle.
EconomicDevelopment and Cultural
Change,v. 38 (July 1990), p. 845-54.
[Update and discussion of the original article, which was published in
v. 36 (July 1988), p. 753-96.]

1990), p. 23-35.
La integraci6n como via para reactivar la economia latinoamericana.
Felipe Pazos. Integraci6nLatinoamericana,v. 15, no. 153 (January/
February 1990), p. 9-14.
La integraci6n latinoamericana en
el decenio de 1990: tiene anm

sentido? Felix Pefia. Integraci6n
Latinoamericana,v. 15, no. 159

(August 1990), p. 36-40.
Exploring the Dimensions of an
International Social Issues Climate.
J. E. McCann, L. G6mez-Mejia.

The Mexican Free-Trade Illusion:
A U.S.-Mexico Trade Agreement
Does Not Presage a Unified Market like the EC-And It May Not
Even Lead to Free Trade. Jeffrey
Schott. InternationalEconomy,v. 4
(June-July 1990), p. 32-34.
Mexico as a Trading Partner. F.J.
Macchiarola. Proceedingsof the Academy of PoliticalScience, v. 37, no. 4
(1990), p. 90-109. [Background article to the current negotiations.]
Mexico: desafios de la integraci6n
econ6mica (oportunidades al

Norte, compromisos al Sur). Jesuis
Puente Leyva. Integraci6nLatinoamericana,v. 15, no. 161-62 (Octo-

ber/November 1990), p. 66-71.
INTAL: objetivos, actividades,
evoluci6n y contribuci6n al proceso de integraci6n latinoamericana
en el periodo 1965-1975. Jose
Maria Aragiio. Integraci6nLatinoamericana,v. 15, no. 159 (August

(April 1990), p. 31-43. [Considering the success of the European
Community, the author urges the
speedy economic integration of
Latin America.]

Agreement: A Canadian Perspective.Jean Raby. AmericanJournal
of InternationalLaw, v. 84 (April
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Latin America and the Caribbean
from a Global Perspective
A Resource Guide for Teachers
Pedro R. Bermudez and Barbara C. Cruz
This ten-part resource guide is a self-contained series of lessons on Latin
America and the Caribbean based on the Hanvey model of global awareness. The lessons focus upon economic development, human rights,
immigration issues, the role of women, and environmental concerns.
Price:$21.00

To order, please make check or money order (US currency only) payable to:
Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, University
Park, Miami, FL 33199. (305) 348-2894; FAX (305) 348-3593.
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